Does the existence of evil disprove an all-powerful, good God?

If God is all-powerful and completely good, why is there so much suffering? This question, called the problem of evil, has been discussed for thousands of years by philosophers, theologians and ordinary people. It is not a question about whether any god exists, but about whether a particular idea of God, all-powerful and all-good, can be true given the world as it is.

The argument is often put in this way. If God could prevent evil but does not, then God is not all-good. If God wants to prevent it but cannot, God is not all-powerful. Evil exists, so, the argument goes, no being with both qualities exists. Philosophers distinguish a logical version, which says that these claims cannot all be true together, from an evidential version, which says that the amount and kind of suffering makes God very unlikely.

Those who answer the argument have offered several replies. One is the free will defence: a world with real freedom, in which people can choose good, must allow the possibility of bad choices. Another is the idea that some goods, such as courage, compassion or growth, require difficulty. Others say that we are not in a position to know what reasons God might have, or that suffering has meaning within a larger plan or a life after death [check: add the names and works you want to cite, for example from modern philosophy of religion].

Critics reply that these answers do not explain suffering that comes from nature, such as disease and disaster, or the suffering of animals and young children who cannot grow from it. Many philosophers today think the logical version has been answered but that the evidential version remains a serious challenge.

If you take part in this debate, it helps to say which version of the argument you mean, which kind of suffering you have in mind, and what you take God to be.